/ ISyE Department Seminar- Itai Gurvich

ISyE Department Seminar- Itai Gurvich

January 1, 1970
12:00 am - 12:00 am
Friday, April 1, 2022 – 11:00 to 12:00
ISyE-Executive Board Room 228-Atlanta, GA
Summary Sentence: 
Near-Optimal Policies for Dynamic Matching

Abstract: We consider centralized dynamic matching markets with finitely many agent types and heterogeneous match values. A network topology determines the feasible matches in the market and the value generated from each match. An inherent trade-off arises between short- and long-term objectives. A social planner may delay match decisions to thicken the market and increase match opportunities to generate high value. This inevitably compromises short-term value, and the planner may match greedily to maximize short-term objectives.

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